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Abstract
Since the capital structure affects the performance of financial institutions confronted to
liquidity constraints, the Economic Capital is determined by the maximisation of value.
Allowing economic decisions to be characterised by a distorted probability distribution
— so assessing the attitude towards risk as well as information and knowledge —
the optimal surplus is expressed as a Value-at-Risk — as recommended by the Basel
Committee. Thus, demanding more capital than regulatory requirements accounts for
different expectations about risks. The optimal surplus is allocated to the lines of
business of a conglomerate according to the borne risk and the type of divisional
managers. Full allocation is assured and no covariances are required. Further, a
mechanism is provided, which allows for the distribution of equity in a decentralised
organisation.
1 Introduction
In a seminal paper, Modigliani and Miller (1959) claimed that in perfect markets the capital
structure of financial institutions does not matter, for at any time it is possible to raise or
release funds if required. Accordingly, the optimal plan — when the objective is maximising
value — is to attract as much debt as possible. Since this fact is not observed in practice,
Modigliani and Miller gave several explanations in subsequent papers, even questioning the
skills of decision makers — as in Miller (1998). However, averse-to-risk customers are sensible
to fluctuations and then the performance of intermediaries depends on providing guarantees
that assumed liabilities are default-free — see Merton (1997). This situation leads manager’s
decisions to be determined also by risk aversion — as long as their reputation depends on
performance.
Usual practices to protect against default risk are hedging, re-insuring and capital cush-
ions. By Economic or Risk Capital we mean an amount of money invested in non risky
assets that serves as a buffer in order to prevent insolvency. Since a price has to be paid
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for raising capital, there is a level of surplus which properly combines the two conflicting
objectives: maximisation of shareholder’s value and minimisation of default risk. Within
a multibusiness environment, the problem of allocation arises due to the gain acquired —
through diversification — when merging the activities of the firm. Such benefit should be
distributed fairly among the subsidiaries — i.e. according to the risk borne. In this context,
many of the allocation principles present in the literature are based on covariances. Full
allocation is also considered as a desirable property — for the aggregate surplus maintained
by divisions should be equal to the level regarded as appropriate for the conglomerate1.
In Merton and Perold (1993) a capital allocation principle is developed based on the
incremental risk of subsidiaries, which is obtained by subtracting the capital required after
suppressing a line of business to the surplus demanded by the whole portfolio. Then the
sum of individual surplus might be lower than the capital hired by the conglomerate — the
difference is explained by the gains in efficiency due to the knowledge of divisional managers.
On this basis, Merton and Perold argue that it is inappropriate to full allocate the capital
— for doing so incentives may be distorted. Myers and Read (2001) consider instead the
marginal capital requirement, defined as the marginal change in the total surplus in response
to a small increment in the equity demanded by a certain line of business. They prove that
full allocation is guaranteed by this principle, provided that some conditions on the valuation
function of capital are satisfied.
Stoughton and Zechner (1999) propose a model to deal with firms that are not able to
continuously raise funds — see also Froot et al (1993) and Jensen (1986). Thus, equity is
distributed in order to maximise the Economic Value Added (EVA) by the lines of business,
and capital allocation is justified as a mechanism that stimulates the exchange of information
inside the institution. In the process, the attitude towards risk is considered, which is
supposed to depend on the ability to apply and transfer skills — as well as the effort expended
to accumulate information. Thus, an optimal mechanism is advanced based on the internal
price of capital. Distortions are allowed in the form of under and overinvestment.
In the following, an allocation principle is proposed which, instead of accounting for
stochastic dependencies, focuses on agency costs due to discrepancies in the expectations kept
by central and divisional managers. Actually, the case of perfect correlation is considered —
when no diversification is possible — in this way modelling the situation when the failure in
any division may damage the credit quality of the whole conglomerate. Section 2 is devoted
to the determination of the optimal amount of economic capital. The attitude towards risk
is determined by a single — functional — parameter, which in imperfect markets accounts
for differences in expectations among decision makers. Thus, the demanded surplus depends
on the risk profile — or the informational type — of decision makers, as well as on the risk
involved. The problem of capital allocation within a multibusiness setting is addressed in
Section 3. A centralised solution is obtained depending on individual exposures. In Section
4 the stand alone allocation is attained by letting subsidiaries to act on their own. Finally,
the problem of agency costs is addressed by establishing an optimal contract. When the
types are not accessible — a situation most probably found in practice — a mechanism
can be designed by fixing the cost of raising capital inside the conglomerate. In this way,
subsidiaries are forced to reveal their type. Section 5 concludes.
1See Albrecht (2004), Hallerbach (2003) and Saita (2004).
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2 Economic Capital as the Optimal Level of Surplus
Consider a financial institution holding assets and liabilities for total market values of A and
L respectively. The net — random — loss suffered each period is then given by X = L−A.
Merton (1977) defines the fair price of insuring liabilities — at any time before the maturity
date — as the present value of the liability claim less the value of a put option on assets with
strike price equal to the value of liabilities2. In the same way, it follows that shareholders
are the owners of a call option on the portfolio of assets whose exercise price is the value of
liabilities. From the Put-Call Parity Theorem, the following relation must hold:
A = C(A,L) + Le−r0T − P (A,L).
Thus, though both the market value of assets and equity are functions of leverage, by the
Put-Call Parity their sum is independent of it. Hence, the market value of the firm — i.e.
the market value of the portfolio of assets A — is independent of the capital structure, as
stated in the Modigliani and Miller proposition — see Miller (1998). However, this reasoning
holds true in perfect markets, i.e. when no restrictions are to be found when borrowing and
lending. Moreover, the hedged portfolio remains non risky only a short period of time
ahead, assuming that during a short period of time market conditions remain unchanged.
Thus, continuous rebalancing is needed. Under these conditions, the conglomerate will be
indifferent between hedging and reinsurance. But decision makers confronted to liquidity
constraints might be interested in replacing — or complementing — their hedging strategy.
By now, assume that central managers know the distribution function of losses FX and
that funds may be hired at the interest rate rk, with rk ≥ r0, where r0 denotes the risk free
interest rate. Decisions are affected by the net cost of capital ηk = rk − r0. Moreover, notice
the firm simultaneously acts in two markets. So whenever a loss occurs cash is demanded
to avoid default, while in the case a gain is obtained, the surplus can be used to buy more
assets or to pay liabilities. Assuming that investors keep different expectations about risk
— as long as they own different information, knowledge, social contacts and capabilities —
and denoting respectively by ϕ and β the types for lending and borrowing, corporate EVA
is given by:
EVA = Eϕ
[
(X + k)−
]− Eβ [(X − k)+]− ηkk.
The term Eϕ
[
(X + k)−
]
denotes the value of the firm when the portfolio is solvent (i.e.
when X < −k), which is diminished by raising the level of surplus. On the other hand,
the term Eβ
[
(X − k)+
]
represents the cost of bankruptcy — or more properly, the cost
of assuming bankruptcy. Demanding more capital leads to a reduction of the burden of
default. Thus, financial intermediaries are able to create value to shareholders as long as
the cost of insuring the aggregate exposure — which can be related to the credit quality, as
perceived by lenders — plus the cost of raising capital is less than expected gains. Notice
how crucial is the role played by the differences in expectations and the symmetry of risks.
2Whenever A ≥ L the firm can afford the debt, but when A < L the guarantor suffers a loss equal to
L− A. Consequently, the guarantor’s claim equals min(A− L, 0) which is identical to that of a put option
— where the promised payment L corresponds to the exercise price and the value of assets corresponds to
the common stock’s price. See also Cummins and Sommer (1996).
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Under homogeneous expectations and symmetric risks, keeping a surplus produces a total
loss and so no capital should be hired — the value of the firm in this case is zero, which is
a reasonable claim in a competitive setting. In this way, the result of the Modigliani and
Miller proposition is obtained — see Stiglitz (1972).
The Wang’s risk principle allows for a characterisation of the mathematical expectation
with respect to a distorted probability distribution, which is obtained by applying a distortion
transformation — i.e. a continuous, strictly increasing function, defined on the unit interval
ϕ : [0, 1] → [0, 1] such that ϕ(0) = 0 and ϕ(1) = 1 — to the decumulative distribution
function SX(x) = 1− FX(x) = P [X > x] in the following way3:
Eϕ [X] =
∫
xdFϕ,X(x) =
∫
[1− Fϕ,X(x)] dx =
∫
ϕ(SX(x))dx.
The traditional expectation operator is obtained when the neutral distortion — equal to
the identity operator ϕ(x) = x, ∀ x — is introduced. Further, Wang and Young (1998) state
the properties:
ϕ concave ⇒ ϕ(y) ≥ y ∀y ∈ [0, 1] ⇒ Eϕ [X] ≥ E [X]
ϕ convex ⇒ ϕ(y) ≤ y ∀y ∈ [0, 1] ⇒ Eϕ [X] ≤ E [X] .
Therefore, concave distortion functions characterise the decisions of averse-to-risk investors
— who overestimates risks — and convex distortions the behaviour of risk lovers — who
underestimates risks. Moreover, applying a Taylor series around zero leads to:
Eϕ
[
(X + k)−
] ≈ Eϕ [X−] + [∂ Eϕ [(X + k)−]
∂k
(k = 0)
]
· k.
Let us accordingly define:
rϕ,X := −
∂ Eϕ
[
(X + k)−
]
∂k
(k = 0) = Fϕ,X(0).
The coefficient rϕ,X corresponds to a premium for solvency — specifically, it expresses the
marginal reduction of the insured return when hiring an additional unit of equity. When
the risk accumulates more probability in gains — remember the variable X represents an
aggregated loss — a higher premium has to be paid. On this basis, the level of Economic
Capital is determined in order to maximise corporate EVA4:
3The distorted probability principle is extended to real-valued random variables as — see Wang et al
(1997): Eϕ [X] =
∫ 0
−∞ [ϕ(SX(t))− 1] dt+
∫∞
0
ϕ(SX(t))dt. Hence, after performing a change of variables, we
can write: Eϕ [X] + Eϕ [X−] = Eϕ [X+]. The right-hand-side of the equation shows the price of a portfolio
containing an insured version of the asset, while the left-hand-side shows the price of a fund containing the
asset and a guarantee to pay the loss incurred by X. Both portfolios have the same value at the end of period,
and hence both should be assigned the same market price. Therefore the condition is consistent with the
no-arbitrage principle.
4A raising principle is presented in this fashion by Dhaene et al (2003) though they propose to minimise
the total capital cost. See also Goovaerts et al (2004), Laeven and Goovaerts (2004) and Froot et al (1993).
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Maxk Eϕ [X−]− Eβ
[
(X − k)+
]− (rϕ,X + ηk)k.
Applying Lagrange optimisation yields the first order condition:
− ∂
∂k
Eβ
[
(X − k)+
]− (rϕ,X + ηk) = Sβ,X(k∗)− (rϕ,X + ηk) = 0.
Hence, the firm attracts debt until the marginal benefit equals the total cost of capital and
the optimal level of surplus is given by:
k∗ = F−1β,X(1− rϕ,X − ηk) = S−1β,X(rϕ,X + ηk) = S−1X
(
β−1(rϕ,X + ηk)
)
.
The term (rϕ,X + ηk) accounts for the total cost of holding an additional unit of capital.
When this index is high — i.e. when a high premium is asked for solvency or a high cost is
confronted when attracting liabilities — less equity is provided. The contrary occurs when
the total cost is low — i.e. when the premium for solvency or the price of capital is low.
Whenever (rϕ,X + ηk) ≥ 1 and (rϕ,X + ηk) ≤ 0, the minimum and the maximum level of cash
are preferred respectively. There is an additional motivation to demand as much surplus
as possible in the later case, for the deterioration in the credit quality of the firm might
raise the net cost ηk. Moreover, averse-to-risk investors, for whom the distortion function is
concave, so that ϕ−1(η) < η, underestimate the price of equity.
The optimal amount of capital — or the Economic Capital — is thus expressed as a
Value-at-Risk under a transformed probability measure. This criterion coincides with the
capital requirement established by the Basel Capital Accord5. Accordingly, the Regulatory
Capital is obtained by applying the neutral distortion and introducing a level of confidence α
— in this way implicitly determining the premium for solvency as well as the cost of capital
by letting α = rϕ,X + ηk. Typically, α = 5% or α = 1%. Since the same confidence level is
asked for every company, the most efficient — which are asked a higher premium for they
hold better investments — are forced to keep more surplus than the optimal level. This loss
in efficiency makes sense from the perspective of the regulator, as long as the social losses
produced because of the simultaneous default of many firms in the industry might be huge
— by affecting the economic activity and the aggregate demand. But on the other hand, the
minimum level required for the intermediaries that perform badly might be underestimated.
3 Optimal Allocation of Economic Capital among Lines
of Business
In order to hold the viewpoint of central managers — or a regulatory authority — confronting
a multibusiness environment, let us suppose that X denotes the aggregate loss of a financial
conglomerate consisting of n ∈ N subsidiaries — or lines of business — such that X equals
the sum of individual risks:
X = X1 + · · ·+Xn.
5See Basel (1996) and Basel (2004).
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Marginal distributions (F1, . . . , Fn) are assumed to be known and since a failure in any
division may damage the reputation of the whole conglomerate, the comonotonic dependence
structure is considered6. When capital decisions are centralised, the cost of the guarantee
can be diminished by merging the individual losses7, for in this way funds can be assigned
only to insolvent divisions — and no idle surplus is maintained. Accordingly, let us establish
an allocation principle based on the minimisation of the sum of exposures — the value of
the firm is already maximised by choosing the level k∗ as the total surplus kept by the
conglomerate:
Minki Eϕ
[
n∑
i=1
(Xi − ki)+
]
subject to
n∑
i=1
ki = k
∗.
Therefore, a diversification effect exists, but it depends on liquidity constraints — and not
on covariances. The only condition imposed is full allocation — as long as capital decisions
on business units are taken by central managers, no other concerns are needed. For the
Lagrange multiplier γ the first order conditions are the following:
∂
∂ki
Eϕ
[
n∑
i=1
(Xi − ki)+
]
+ γ = −Sϕ,Xi (k∗i ) + γ = 0 ∀ i = 1, . . . , n
n∑
i=1
k∗i = k
∗.
Let us denote by FXc the probability distribution of the comonotonic sum X
c = Xc1 +
· · ·+Xcn, where (Xc1, . . . , Xcn) represents the comonotonic random vector with same marginal
distributions as (X1, . . . , Xn). Since the inverse distribution of the comonotonic sum is given
by the sum of the inverse marginal distributions — see Dhaene et al (2002) — we get that
γ is determined such that:
F−1ϕ,Xc(1− γ) =
n∑
i=1
F−1ϕ,Xi(1− γ) =
n∑
i=1
k∗i = k
∗.
Thus, the optimal risk capitals allocated to the business units are given by:
k∗i = F
−1
ϕ,Xi
(Fϕ,Xc (k
∗)) ∀ i = 1, . . . , n.
These levels of equity determine the centralised solution — for both the raising and the
allocation principles have been established according to the risk attitude and knowledge of
central managers.
6Comonotonicity characterises an extreme case of dependence, when no benefit can be obtained from
diversification — see Dhaene et al (2002).
7Mathematically, this result is sustained by the fact that the distorted probability principle preserves
the first stochastic order, defined by X ≤ Y ⇔ SX(t) ≤ SY (t), ∀t . Therefore, Eϕ
[
(X − k)+
] ≤
Eϕ
[∑n
i=1 (Xi − ki)+
]
when
∑n
i=1 ki = k. See Goovaerts et al (2004) and Laeven and Goovaerts (2004).
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4 Optimal Decentralised Mechanism
Full allocation suffices for centralised organisations. But divisions are run by managers who
access better information about investment opportunities, a situation that leads shareholders
to incur in agency costs — see Jensen (1986). So let us consider subsidiaries as separate units
that maximise value but do not assume the reduction of the insured return — and hence
do not internalise the premium for solvency in decision making. By putting the burden of
bankruptcy on their shoulders, central managers attain a gain due to the diversification of
the liquidity constraint — as stated in Section 3. Accordingly, as long as subsidiaries hire
capital from central management at the net internal cost η, divisional EVA is defined in the
following way:
EVA = Eϕi
[
(Xi)−
]− Eϕi [(Xi − ki)+]− ηk.
Therefore, divisions maximise value by minimising the total loss Eϕi
[
(Xi − ki)+
]
+ ηk.
After the first order condition, the stand alone risk capital is determined by:
ki(η) = F
−1
ϕi,Xi
(1− η) ∀ i = 1, . . . , n.
By means of the net cost η, the capital decisions of subsidiaries may be distorted —
forcing them to internalise bankruptcy according to the interest of the conglomerate. So in
order to encourage averse-to-risk managers to raise less capital, its cost might be overcharged.
A return over the market rate rk should be assigned in this situation — such that η > ηk.
On the contrary, risk lovers might be subsidised — so that η < ηk — for giving them
incentives to hire more capital. The optimal levels of economic capital and internal cost are
simultaneously determined by introducing the following allocation principle — see Diamond
and Verrecchia (1982):
Maxk,η Eϕ [ X−]− Eϕ
[
(X − k)+
]− (rϕ,X + ηk) · k
subject to ki = ki(η) and
n∑
i=1
ki = k.
Applying Lagrange optimisation leads the solution to be characterised by:
Sϕ,X (k
∗) = rϕ,X + ηk and
n∑
i=1
k∗i = k
∗.
Hence, the same optimal surplus of Section 2 is obtained for the conglomerate, while the
internal cost of capital is determined such that full allocation is assured:
n∑
i=1
F−1ϕi,Xi (1− η∗) = k∗.
Therefore, if Fϕ1,..., ϕn,Xc =
(∑n
i=1 F
−1
ϕi,Xi
)−1
denotes the distribution function of the
comonotonic sum when marginal distributions are given by (Fϕ1,X1 , . . . , Fϕn,Xn), then the
optimal level of the net internal cost of capital is given by:
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η∗ = 1− Fϕ1,..., ϕn,Xc (k∗) .
In this way, a decentralised allocation is determined — the same benefit as under the cen-
tralised prescription is obtained and so no efficiency is lost. When the types of subsidiaries
are not observable, central managers may calibrate their estimations by comparing the pre-
ferred amounts of equity with the optimal levels k∗i . Therefore, by letting divisional managers
to act independently they are forced to reveal their type. We can then say the proposed
mechanism provides a basis to measure the disagreement between central management and
business units.
5 Conclusions
According to the Modigliani and Miller (1959) proposition, the capital structure of a financial
institution does not affect its value for it is always possible to raise or release funds in the
market. However, this is not a suitable assumption for imperfect markets. Actually, after
Merton (1997), the level of surplus matters for averse-to-risk lenders who are sensible to the
possibility of bankruptcy of the borrower. Accordingly, the decisions of managers, whose
reputation depends on performance, are also affected by risk aversion. In this context, the
value of the firm depends on its capital structure, and the Economic Capital is defined such
that the Economic Value Added (EVA) is maximised.
TheWang’s principle— see Wang et al (1997) — allows expressing the cost of bankruptcy
as an expectation with respect to a distorted probability distribution. The — functional —
distortion type simultaneously accounts for risk attitude and knowledge, and investors are
supposed to maintain different expectations — an approach already adopted by Stiglitz
(1972). The optimal level of surplus is then a function of the total cost of equity — defined
as the premium for solvency plus the net capital cost — as well as the risk involved, and since
no restrictions are imposed on the distribution functions of returns, the model is suitable both
to financial and insurance applications. Thus, decision makers internalise the price of equity,
though it is underestimated by risk averse investors — who apply a concave transformation
to the probability distribution and consequently demand more capital.
Specifically, the Economic Capital is expressed as a Value-at-Risk under a distorted prob-
ability measure, at the time the Regulatory Capital is obtained by applying no distortion and
fixing a confidence level α — which in this way plays the same role as the total equity cost
and hence in the model both coefficients are given the same meaning. Capital decisions over
the minimum regulatory requirement are then explained by risk aversion — for payments
are overestimated in this case. However, risk lover investors may overestimate exposures as
well, as long as the type also accounts for information and knowledge. In this context, the
excess of surplus induces a gain in efficiency, and not the opposite.
A centralised allocation of equity is determined by maximising corporate EVA and min-
imising bankruptcy costs according to the expectations of central managers. For a decen-
tralised organisation, an optimal mechanism is proposed, whose instrument is the internal
cost of capital. The same level of surplus is maintained by the conglomerate under both
principles. When central managers do not know the types of subsidiaries, the estimations
may be calibrated a posteriori — by looking for the functional types which are consistent
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with the preferred levels of equity. Thus, the mechanism promotes transparency within the
institution. Moreover, the burden of arithmetic operations may be reduced if the distor-
tion function is parametrically determined, such that a single real number accounts for the
informational type8.
Finally, the mechanism can be useful for regulatory purposes by determining the types
which are consistent with the levels of risk capital observed in the industry. Institutions
demanding the minimum capital requirement might be expecting a higher performance from
their investments than suggested by average knowledge. Moreover, though it is not possible
to know when companies are underestimating their risk — as long as some information is
private — rational decision makers reveal their type — for they maximise value.
References
[1] Albrecht, P. (2004). “Risk-based capital allocation”, Encyclopedia of Actuarial Science:
1459-1466. John Wiley & sons.
[2] Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (1996). “Amendment to the capital accord to
incorporate market risks”, http://www.bis.org
[3] Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2004). “International convergence of capital
measurement and capital standards. A revised framework”, http://www.bis.org
[4] Cummins, J.D. and Sommer, D.W. (1996). “Capital and risk property-liability insurance
markets”, Journal of Banking and Finance, 20:1069-1092.
[5] Dhaene, J., Goovaerts, M. and Kaas, R. (2003). “Economic Capital Allocation Derived
from Risk Measures”, North American Actuarial Journal, 7 (2): 44-59.
[6] Dhaene, J., Denuit, M., Goovaerts, M., Kaas, R. and Vyncke, D. (2002). “The Concept
of Comonotonicity in Actuarial Science and Finance: Theory”, Insurance: Mathematics
& Economics, 31 (1): 3-33.
[7] Diamond, D.W. and Verrecchia, R.E. (1982). “Optimal managerial contracts and equi-
librium security prices”, The Journal of Finance, 37 (2): 275-287.
[8] Froot, K.A., Scharfstein, D.S. and Stein, J.C. (1993). “Risk management: coordinating
corporate investment and financing policies”, The Journal of Finance, 48 (5): 1629-
1658.
[9] Goovaerts, M.J., Van den Borre, E. and Laeven, R.J.A. (2004). “Man-
aging economic and virtual economic capital within financial conglomerates”,
http://econ.kuleuven.be/tew/academic/actuawet/research.htm
[10] Hallerbach, W.G. (2003). “Capital allocation, portfolio enhancement and performance
measurement: a unified approach”, http://www.gloriamundi.org
8In Mierzejewski (2006) the model is presented in these terms. See also Wang (1995).
9
[11] Jensen, M.C. (1986). “Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and
Takeovers”, The American Economic Review, 76 (2):323-329.
[12] Laeven, R.J.A. and Goovaerts, M.J. (2004). “An optimization approach to the dynamic
allocation of economic capital”, http://www.gloriamundi.org
[13] Merton, R.C. (1977). “An analytic derivation of the cost of deposit insurance and loan
guarantees”, Journal of Banking and Finance, 1:3-11.
[14] Merton, R.C. (1997). “A model of contract guarantees for credit-sensitive, opaque fi-
nancial intermediaries”, European Finance Review, 1:1-13.
[15] Merton, R.C. and Perold, A.F. (1993). “Theory of risk capital in financial firms”, Jour-
nal of Applied Corporate Finance, 5:16-32.
[16] Mierzejewski, F. (2006). “Optimal Capital Allocation confronting Bankruptcy and
Agency Costs”, Bank- en Financiewezen / Revue bancaire et financire, 2006/2 (March):
72:77.
[17] Miller, M.H. (1998). “The Modigliani-Miller propositions after thirty years”, Journal of
Economic Perspectives, 2 (4): 99-120.
[18] Modigliani, F. and Miller, M.H. (1959). “The cost of capital, corporation finance and
the theory of investment”, American Economic Review, 49 (4): 655-69.
[19] Myers, S.C. and Read Jr., J.A. (2001). “Capital Allocation for Insurance Companies”,
Journal of Risk and Insurance 68 (4): 545-580.
[20] Saita, F. (2004). “Risk capital aggregation: the risk managers perspective”,
http://www.gloriamundi.org
[21] Stiglitz, J. (1972). “Some aspects of the pure theory of corporate finance: bankruptcies
and take-overs”, Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science, 3 (2): 458-482.
[22] Stoughton, N.M. and Zechner, J. (1999). “Optimal capital allocation using RAROC and
EVA”, http://www.gloriamundi.org
[23] Wang, S. (1995). “Insurance pricing and increased limits ratemaking by proportional
hazards transforms”, Insurance: Mathematics & Economics, 17: 43-54.
[24] Wang, S. and Young, V. (1998). “Ordering risks: Expected utility theory versus Yaaris
dual theory of risk”, Insurance: Mathematics & Economics, 22: 145-161.
[25] Wang, S., Young, V. and Panjer, H. (1997). “Axiomatic characterization of insurance
prices”, Insurance: Mathematics & Economics, 21: 173-183.
10
